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ON THE MASAMI YASUDA STOPPING GAME
KRZYSZTOF J. SZAJOWSKI
Abstract. The sero-sum stopping game for the stochastic sequences has been
formulated in late sixties of the twenty century by Dynkin [5]. The formulation
had the assumption about separability of decision moment of the players which
simplified the construction of the solution. Further research by Neveu [22]
extended the model by admitting more general behaviour of the players and
their pay–offs. In new formulation there is the problem with existence of
the equilibrium. The proper approach to solution of the problem without
restriction of former models was developed by Yasuda [44]. The results was
crucial in these research. The author made often reference to the Yasuda’s [44]
result in his works (see [36, 37, 38]) as well as see results of others stimulated
by this paper. Withal, in this note another stopping game model, developed
by Yasuda with coauthors (see e.g. [14] and [40]) is recalled. The application
of the model to an analysis of system of detectors shows the power of the game
theory methods.
In the last part of the paper I would like to express my personal relation to
the Masami Yasuda game.
1. Introduction
The mathematical modelling of economic and engineering systems in stochas-
tic environment leads to various mathematical optimization and game theory
problems. If the decision problem relies on choice of intervention moments one
can formulate the model of such case as the optimal stopping problem. If it is
allowed to react more than once the approach depends on the number of deci-
sion makers and their aims. If there is one decision maker and two reactions
(or fix number of possible moment of actions) we have the optimal two stopping
(multiple stopping) problem. When there are two decision makers with their
prescribed aims we usually treat the problem as the stopping game. The related
models bring very subtle mathematical questions concerning the correctness of
the model, possibility of inference about rational strategies, their realization and
the existence of solution in the formulated mathematical model. In this note
I would like to focus our attention of two group of models not very precisely
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2 K. J. Szajowski
defined. The first one is related to the existence of solution under mild as-
sumption on the processes defining the payoffs in the zero-sum stopping game
related to problem introduced by Dynkin [5] (see the section 1.1). The second
group of the problems, which I have applied recently to modelling the sensor net-
works, developed by Yasuda with co-authors (see e.g. [14] and [40]), is devoted
to multivariate stopping problem when there are decision makers having some
interactions between each others (see the section 1.2).
1.1. The randomize strategies in Dynkins game. E. B. Dynkin [5] pre-
sented the following problem: two players observe a stochastic sequence Xn,
n = 1, 2, .... Each of them chooses a stopping time, say λ (resp. µ) be the
stopping time chosen by the first (resp. the second) player. It is additionally
assumed that the first player can stop at odd and the second at even moments.
The pay-off is then: R(λ, µ) = EXλ∧µ. The player 1 seeks to maximize the ex-
pected pay-off, and the player 2 seeks to minimize it, it means that the solution
is a pair (λ?, µ?) such that
(1.1) R(λ, µ?) ≤ (λ?, µ?) ≤ (λ?, µ).
J. Neveu [22] modified this problem as follows: there are three random se-
quences (Xn,Fn), (Yn,Fn) and (Wn,Fn) with
Assumptions 1.2.
(1.3) Xn ≤ Wn ≤ Yn for each n ∈ N,
and the pay-off equals:
(1.4) R(λ, µ) = E{XλI{λ<µ} +WλI{λ=µ} + YµI{µ<λ}},
where λ, µ ∈ S are stopping times with respect to Fn.This problem has solution
which is presented in [22].
When the assumption 1.2 is not fulfilled then, in general there are no equilib-
rium in the set of stopping times with respect of observed processes (Xn,Fn),
(Yn,Fn) and (Wn,Fn). It is M. Yasuda who shown in [44] that the mixed ex-
tension of this game has equilibrium without the assumption 1.2. The mixed
extension in this case means that the set of strategies (stopping times) is ex-
tended to include randomized stopping time. First, a finite horizon problem is
considered. Next, the existence of the value and the equilibrium point in the
infinite horizon problem with a discount factor is proved under some natural
assumption concerning the integrability of the considered processes.
In that time there were many mathematicians doing research in stopping game
(see e.g. the papers by Zabczyk [50], Stettner [34], Ohtsubo [23]). The Yasuda’s
paper [44] stimulated further research of Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille [28] and
Laraki and Solan [17] in the mixed extension of the stopping game for the pro-
cesses with continuous parameter.
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1.2. The stopping processes by voting procedure. Let us consider p person
stopping game related to the observation of a Markov chain. Let (Xn,Fn,Px),
n = 0, 1, 2, . . ., be a homogeneous Markov chain defined on a probability space
(Ω,F,P) with state space (E,B). The players are able to observe the Markov
chain sequentially. At each moment n their knowledge is represented by Fn.
Each player has his own utility function fi : E→ <, i = 1, 2, . . . , p, and at each
moment n each player declares separately his willingness to stop the observation
of the process. The effective ends of the process and realization of the payoffs
appears when a suitable subset of players agree to it. The aim of each player is
to maximize their expected payoffs. In fact, the problem will be formulated as
a p person non-cooperative game with the concept of Nash equilibrium [21] as
the solution. On the other hand, one can say that the considered multilateral
stopping procedure is based on sequential voting (cf [7], [10], [43] for monotone
rule concept and the mathematics of voting).
Such model has been considered in mine and Yasuda paper [40] and Fergu-
son [6]. Both papers were continuation of Masami Yasuda and his co-workers,
Kurano and Nakagami research published in [14], [46], [45], [48]. They have
investigated the multilateral version of the optimal stopping problem for inde-
pendent, identically distributed p dimensional random vectors Xn. The gain
function of the i-th player is X in (i-th coordinate of Xn). In [14] the following
class of strategies is used.
(1) Each player can declare to stop at any stage.
(2) The majority level r (1 ≤ r ≤ p) is chosen by the players at the beginning
of the game.
(3) During the sequential observation process, if the number of players declar-
ing to stop is greater than or equal to the level r, the process must be
stopped.
This class of strategies is generalized in [46] to monotone rules. Roughly speaking,
a monotone rule is a p variate, non-decreasing logical function defined on {0, 1}p.
In both papers the problem is formulated as a p person, non-cooperative game
with concept of Nash point as a solution. Paper [14] generalizes the unanimity
case, i.e. p = r solved by Sakaguchi [29]. The motivation for the model considered
is the secretary problem (see [9] for the formulation of the problem). A solution
of some bivariate version of the secretary problem is given in [14]. Presman and
Sonin [26] treat this problem with another set of strategies. They considered the
model in which each player’s decision does not affect the stopping of the process
but his reward only. Sakaguchi [30] and Kadane [12] have solved a multilateral
sequential decision problem in which decisions whether to stop are made by the
players alternately, instead of simultaneous decision under a monotone rule.
The recent paper on the voting stopping problem are [20].
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2. Sensors’ network and stopping games
In [39] the construction of the mathematical model for a multivariate surveil-
lance system is presented. It is assumed that there is net N of p nodes which
register (observe) signals modeled by discrete time multivariate stochastic pro-
cess. At each node the state is the signal at moment n ∈ N which is at least
one coordinate of the vector −→x n ∈ E ⊂ <m. The distribution of the signal
at each node has two forms and depends on a pure or a dirty environment of
the node. The state of the system change dynamically. We consider the dis-
crete time observed signal as m ≥ p dimensional process defined on the fixed
probability space (Ω,F ,P). The observed at each node process is Markovian
with two different transition probabilities (see [31] for details). In the signal the
visual consequence of the transition distribution changes at moment θi, i ∈ N
is a change of its character. To avoid false alarm the confirmation from other
nodes is needed. The family of subsets (coalitions) of nodes are defined in such
a way that the decision of all member of some coalition is equivalent with the
claim of the net that the disorder appeared. It is not sure that the disorder
has had place. The aim is to define the rules of nodes and a construction of
the net decision based on individual nodes claims. Various approaches can be
found in the recent research for description or modelling of such systems (see e.g.
[42], [27]). The problem is quite similar to a pattern recognition with multiple
algorithm when the fusions of individual algorithms results are unified to a final
decision. The proposed solution will be based on a simple game and the stopping
game defined by a simple game on the observed signals. It gives a centralized,
Bayesian version of the multivariate detection with a common fusion center that
it has perfect information about observations and a priori knowledge of the sta-
tistics about the possible distribution changes at each node. Each sensor (player)
will declare to stop when it detects disorder at his region. Based on the simple
game the sensors’ decisions are aggregated to formulate the decision of the fusion
center. The sensors’ strategies are constructed as an equilibrium strategy in a
non-cooperative game with a logical function defined by a simple game (which
aggregates their decision).
This approach uses the general description of such multivariate stopping games
presented in the section 1.2. The voting aggregation rules are relieved by the sim-
ple game (see Ferguson [6]) and the underlining processes form Markov sequences
(see [40]).
The model of disorder detection at each sensor are presented in the next sec-
tion. It allows to define the individual pay-off of the players (sensors). It is
assumed that the sensors are distributed in homogeneous way in the guarded
area and the intruders behaviour are well modelled by symmetric random walk.
By these assumptions in the section 3 the a priori distribution of the disorder
moment at each node can be chosen in such a way that it gives the best model of
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the structure of sensors and the behaviour of intruder . The section 4 introduces
the aggregation method based on a simple game of the sensors. The section 5
contains derivation of the non-cooperative game and existence theorem for equi-
librium strategy. The final decision based on the state of the sensors is given by
the fusion center and it is described in the section 6.1. The natural direction of
further research is formulated also in the same section. A conclusion and resume
of an algorithm for rational construction of the surveillance system is included
in the section 6.2.
The extension of non-cooperative games to the case when the communication
between player is allowed leads to various solutions concepts. The voting stopping
game is interesting approach also in this direction of research.
3. Detection of disorder at sensors
Following the consideration of Section 1, let us suppose that the process
{−→X n, n ∈ N}, N = {0, 1, 2, . . .}, is observed sequentially in such a way that
each sensor, e.g. r (gets its coordinates in the vector
−→
X n at moment n). By
assumption, it is a stochastic sequence that has the Markovian structure given
random moment θr, in such a way that the process after θr starts from state−→
X n θr−1. The objective is to detect these moments based on the observation
of
−→
X n · at each sensor separately. There are some results on the discrete time
case of such disorder detection which generalize the basic problem stated by
Shiryaev in [32] (see e.g. Brodsky and Darkhovsky [2], Bojdecki [1], Poor and
Hadjiliadis [25], Yoshida [49], Szajowski [35]) in various directions.
Application of the model for the detection of traffic anomalies in networks has
been discussed by Tartakovsky et al. [41]. The version of the problem when the
moment of disorder is detected with given precision will be used here (see [31]).
3.1. Formulation of the problem. The observable random variables {−→X n}n∈N
are consistent with the filtration Fn (or Fn = σ(−→X 0,−→X 1, . . . ,−→X n)). The random
vectors
−→
X n take values in (E,B), where E ⊂ <m. On the same probability
space there are defined unobservable (hence not measurable with respect to Fn)
random variables {θr}mr=1 which have the geometric distributions:
P(θr = j) = p
j−1
r qr, qr = 1− pr ∈ (0, 1), j = 1, 2, . . ..(3.1)
The sensor r follows the process which is based on switching between two, time
homogeneous and independent, Markov processes {X irn}n∈N, i = 0, 1, r ∈ N with
the state space (E,B), both independent of {θr}mr=1. Moreover, it is assumed
that the processes {X irn}n∈N have transition densities with respect to the σ-finite
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measure µ, i.e., for any B ∈ B we have
Pix(X
i
r1 ∈ B) = P(X ir1 ∈ B|X ir0 = x) =
∫
B
f rix (y)µ(dy).(3.2)
The random processes {Xrn}, {X0rn}, {X1rn} and the random variables θr are
connected via the rule: conditionally on θr = k
Xrn =
{
X0rn, if k > n,
X1r n+1−k, if k ≤ n,
where {X1rn} is started from X0r k−1 (but is otherwise independent of X0r ·).
For any fixed dr ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} we are looking for the stopping time τ ∗r ∈ T
such that
(3.3) Px(|θr − τ ∗r | ≤ dr) = sup
τ∈SX
Px(|θr − τ | ≤ dr)
where SX denotes the set of all stopping times with respect to the filtration
{Fn}n∈N. The parameters dr determines the precision level of detection and it
can be different for too early and too late detection. These payoff functions
measure the chance of detection of intruder.
3.2. Construction of the optimal detection strategy. In [31] the construc-
tion of τ ∗ by transformation of the problem to the optimal stopping problem for
the Markov process
−→
ξ has been made, such that
−→
ξ rn = (
−→
X r n−1−dr,n,Πn), where−→
X r n−1−dr,n = (
−→
X r n−1−dr , . . . ,
−→
X r n) and Πrn is the posterior process:
Πr0 = 0,
Πrn = Px (θr ≤ n | Fn) , n = 1, 2, . . .
which is designed as information about the distribution of the disorder instant θr.
In this equivalent the problem of the payoff function for sensor r is hr(
−→x r dr+2, α).
4. The aggregated decision via the cooperative game
There are various methods combining the decisions of several classifiers or sen-
sors. Each ensemble member contributes to some degree to the decision at any
point of the sequentially delivered states. The fusion algorithm takes into account
all the decision outputs from each ensemble member and comes up with an en-
semble decision. When classifier outputs are binary, the fusion algorithms include
the majority voting [15], [16], na¨ıve Bayes combination [3], behavior knowledge
space [11], probability approximation [13] and singular value decomposition [18].
The majority vote is the simplest. The extension of this method is a simple
game.
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4.1. A simple game. Let us assume that there are many nodes absorbing infor-
mation and make decision if the disorder has appeared or not. The final decision
is made in the fusion center which aggregates information from all sensors. The
nature of the system and their role is to detect intrusion in the system as soon
as possible but without false alarm.
The voting decision is made according to the rules of a simple game. Let us
recall that a coalition is a subset of the players. Let C = {C : C ⊂ N} denote
the class of all coalitions.
Definition 4.1. (see [24], [6]) A simple game is coalition game having the char-
acteristic function, φ(·) : C → {0, 1}.
Let us denote W = {C ⊂ N : φ(C) = 1} and L = {C ⊂ N : φ(C) = 0}. The
coalitions in W are called the winning coalitions, and those from L are called
the losing coalitions.
Assumptions 4.2. By assumption the characteristic function satisfies the prop-
erties:
(1) N ∈ W;
(2) ∅ ∈ L;
(3) (the monotonicity): T ⊂ S ∈ L implies T ∈ L.
4.2. The aggregated decision rule. When the simple game is defined and the
players can vote presence or absence, xi = 1 or xi = 0, i ∈ N, of the intruder
then the aggregated decision is given by the logical function
(4.3) pi(x1, x2, . . . , xp) =
∑
C∈W
∏
i∈C
xi
∏
i/∈C
(1− xi).
For the logical function pi we have (cf [46])
pi(x1, . . . , xp) = xi · pi(x1, . . . ,
i
1˘, . . . , xp) + xi · pi(x1, . . . ,
i
0˘, . . . , xp).
5. A non-cooperative stopping game
Following the results of the author and Yasuda [40] the multilateral stopping
of a Markov chain problem can be described in the terms of the notation used
in the non-cooperative game theory (see [21], [4], [19], [24]). Let (
−→
X n,Fn,Px),
n = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N , be a homogeneous Markov chain with state space (E,B). The
horizon can be finite or infinite. The players are able to observe the Markov chain
sequentially. Each player has their utility function fi : E → <, i = 1, 2, . . . , p,
such that Ex|fi(−→X 1)| < ∞. If process is not stopped at moment n, then each
player, based on Fn, can declare independently their willingness to stop the
observation of the process.
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Definition 5.1. (see [46]) An individual stopping strategy of the player i (ISS)
is the sequence of random variables {σin}Nn=1, where σin : Ω → {0, 1}, such that
σin is Fn-measurable.
The interpretation of the strategy is following. If σin = 1 then player i declares
that they would like to stop the process and accept the realization of Xn. Denote
σi = (σi1, σ
i
2, . . . , σ
i
N) and let S
i be the set of ISSs of player i, i = 1, 2, . . . , p.
Define
S = S1 ×S2 × . . .×Sp.
The element σ = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σp)T ∈ S will be called the stopping strategy (SS).
The stopping strategy σ ∈ S is a random matrix. The rows of the matrix are the
ISSs. The columns are the decisions of the players at successive moments. The
factual stopping of the observation process, and the players realization of the
payoffs is defined by the stopping strategy exploiting p-variate logical function.
Let pi : {0, 1}p → {0, 1}. In this stopping game model the stopping strategy
is the list of declarations of the individual players. The aggregate function pi
converts the declarations to an effective stopping time.
Definition 5.2. A stopping time tpi(σ) generated by the SS σ ∈ S and the
aggregate function pi is defined by
tpi(σ) = inf{1 ≤ n ≤ N : pi(σ1n, σ2n, . . . , σpn) = 1}
(inf(∅) = ∞). Since pi is fixed during the analysis we skip index pi and write
t(σ) = tpi(σ).
We have {ω ∈ Ω : tpi(σ) = n} =
⋂n−1
k=1{ω ∈ Ω : pi(σ1k, σ2k, . . . , σpk) = 0} ∩ {ω ∈
Ω : pi(σ1n, σ
2
n, . . . , σ
p
n) = 1} ∈ Fn, then the random variable tpi(σ) is stopping time
with respect to {Fn}Nn=1. For any stopping time tpi(σ) and i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p}, let
fi(Xtpi(σ)) =
{
fi(Xn) if tpi(σ) = n,
lim supn→∞ fi(Xn) if tpi(σ) =∞
(cf [33], [40]). If players use SS σ ∈ S and the individual preferences are con-
verted to the effective stopping time by the aggregate rule pi, then player i gets
fi(Xtpi(σ)).
Let ∗σ = (∗σ1, ∗σ2, . . . , ∗σp)T be fixed SS. Denote
∗σ(i) = (∗σ1, . . . , ∗σi−1, σi, ∗σi+1, . . . , ∗σp)T .
Definition 5.3. (cf. [40]) Let the aggregate rule pi be fixed. The strategy
∗σ = (∗σ1, ∗σ2, . . . , ∗σp)T ∈ S is an equilibrium strategy with respect to pi if for
each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p} and any σi ∈ Si we have
(5.4) Exfi(
−→
X tpi(∗σ)) ≥ Exfi(
−→
X tpi(∗σ(i))).
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The set of SS S, the vector of the utility functions f = (f1, f2, . . . , fp) and the
monotone rule pi define the non-cooperative game G = (S,f ,pi). The construction
of the equilibrium strategy ∗σ ∈ S in G is provided in [40]. For completeness
this construction will be recalled here. Let us define an individual stopping set
on the state space. This set describes the ISS of the player. With each ISS of
player i the sequence of stopping events Din = {ω : σin = 1} combines. For each
aggregate rule pi there exists the corresponding set value function Π : F → F
such that pi(σ1n, σ
2
n, . . . , σ
p
n) = pi{ID1n , ID2n , . . . , IDpn} = IΠ(D1n,D2n,...,Dpn). For solution
of the considered game the important class of ISS and the stopping events can
be defined by subsets C i ∈ B of the state space E. A given set C i ∈ B will be
called the stopping set for player i at moment n if Din = {ω : Xn ∈ C i} is the
stopping event.
For the logical function pi we have
pi(x1, . . . , xp) = xi · pi(x1, . . . ,
i
1˘, . . . , xp) + xi · pi(x1, . . . ,
i
0˘, . . . , xp).
It implies that for Di ∈ F
(5.5)
Π(D1, . . . , Dp) = {Di ∩ Π(D1, . . . ,
i
Ω˘, . . . , Dp)}
∪{Di ∩ Π(D1, . . . ,
i
∅˘, . . . , Dp)}.
Let fi, gi be the real valued, integrable (i.e. Ex|fi(X1)| <∞) function defined
on E. For fixed Djn, j = 1, 2, . . . , p, j 6= i, and C i ∈ B define
ψ(C i) = Ex
[
fi(X1)IiD1(Di1) + gi(X1)IiD1(Di1)
]
where iD1(A) = Π(D
1
1, . . . , D
i−1
1 , A,D
i+1
1 , . . . , D
p
1) and D
i
1 = {ω : Xn ∈ C i}. Let
a+ = max{0, a} and a− = min{0,−a}.
Lemma 5.6. Let fi, gi, be integrable and let C
j ∈ B, j = 1, 2, . . . , p, j 6= i, be
fixed. Then the set ∗C i = {x ∈ E : fi(x)− gi(x) ≥ 0} ∈ B is such that
ψ(∗C i) = sup
C i∈B
ψ(C i)
and
ψ(∗C i) = Ex(fi(X1)− gi(X1))+IiD1(Ω)(5.7)
−Ex(fi(X1)− gi(X1))−IiD1(Ω) + Exgi(X1).
Based on Lemma 5.6 we derive the recursive formulae defining the equilibrium
point and the equilibrium payoff for the finite horizon game.
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5.1. The finite horizon game. Let horizon N be finite. If the equilibrium
strategy ∗σ exists, then we denote vi,N(x) = Exfi(Xt(∗σ)) the equilibrium payoff
of i-th player when X0 = x. For the backward induction we introduce a useful
notation. Let Sin = {{σik}, k = n, . . . , N} be the set of ISS for moments n ≤
k ≤ N and Sn = S1n ×S2n × . . . ×Spn. The SS for moments not earlier than n
is nσ = (nσ1, nσ2, . . . , nσp) ∈ Sn, where nσi = (σin, σin+1, . . . , σiN). Denote
tn = tn(σ) = t(
nσ) = inf{n ≤ k ≤ N : pi(σ1k, σ2k, . . . , σpk) = 1}
to be the stopping time not earlier than n.
Definition 5.8. The stopping strategy n∗σ = (n∗σ1, n∗σ2, . . . , n∗σp) is an equilib-
rium in Sn if
Exfi(Xtn(∗σ)) ≥ Exfi(Xtn(∗σ(i))) Px − a.e.
for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p}, where
n∗σ(i) = (n∗σ1, . . . , n∗σi−1, nσi, n∗σi+1, . . . , n∗σp).
Denote
vi,N−n+1(Xn−1) = Ex[fi(Xtn(∗σ))|Fn−1] = EXn−1fi(Xtn(∗σ)).
At moment n = N the players have to declare to stop and vi,0(x) = fi(x). Let us
assume that the process is not stopped up to moment n, the players are using the
equilibrium strategies ∗σik, i = 1, 2, . . . , p, at moments k = n+ 1, . . . , N . Choose
player i and assume that other players are using the equilibrium strategies ∗σjn,
j 6= i, and player i is using strategy σin defined by stopping set C i. Then the
expected payoff ϕN−n(Xn−1,C i) of player i in the game starting at moment n,
when the state of the Markov chain at moment n− 1 is Xn−1, is equal to
ϕN−n(Xn−1,C i) = EXn−1
[
fi(Xn)Ii∗Dn(Din) + vi,N−n(Xn)Ii∗Dn(Din)
]
,
where i∗Dn(A) = Π(∗D1n, . . . ,
∗Di−1n , A,
∗Di+1n , . . . ,
∗Dpn).
By Lemma 5.6 the conditional expected gain ϕN−n(XN−n,C i) attains the max-
imum on the stopping set ∗C in = {x ∈ E : fi(x)− vi,N−n(x) ≥ 0} and
(5.1)
vi,N−n+1(Xn−1) = Ex[(fi(Xn)− vi,N−n(Xn))+Ii∗Dn(Ω)|Fn−1]
−Ex[(fi(Xn)− vi,N−n(Xn))−Ii∗Dn(∅)|Fn−1]
+Ex[vi,N−n(Xn)|Fn−1]
Px−a.e.. It allows to formulate the following construction of the equilibrium
strategy and the equilibrium value for the game G.
Theorem 5.2. In the game Gwith finite horizon N we have the following solu-
tion.
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(i): The equilibrium value vi(x), i = 1, 2, . . . , p, of the game G can be cal-
culated recursively as follows:
(1) vi,0(x) = fi(x);
(2) For n = 1, 2, . . . , N we have Px−a.e.
vi,n(x) = Ex[(fi(XN−n+1)− vi,n−1(XN−n+1))+Ii∗DN−n+1(Ω)|FN−n]
−Ex[(fi(XN−n+1)− vi,n−1(XN−n+1))−Ii∗DN−n+1(∅)|FN−n]
+Ex[vi,n−1(XN−n+1)|FN−n],
for i = 1, 2, . . . , p.
(ii): The equilibrium strategy ∗σ ∈ S is defined by the SS of the players ∗σin,
where ∗σin = 1 if Xn ∈ ∗C in, and ∗C in = {x ∈ E : fi(x) − vi,N−n(x) ≥ 0},
n = 0, 1, . . . , N .
We have vi(x) = vi,N(x), and Exfi(Xt(∗σ)) = vi,N(x), i = 1, 2, . . . , p.
6. Infinite horizon game
In this class of games the equilibrium strategy is presented in Definition 5.3
but in class of SS
S∗f = {σ ∈ S∗ : Exf−i (Xt(σ)) <∞ for every x ∈ E, i = 1, 2, . . . , p}.
Let ∗σ ∈ S∗f be an equilibrium strategy. Denote
vi(x) = Exfi(Xt(∗σ)).
Let us assume that (n+1)∗σ ∈ S∗f,n+1 is constructed and it is an equilibrium
strategy. If players j = 1, 2, . . . , p, j 6= i, apply at moment n the equilibrium
strategies ∗σjn , player i the strategy σ
i
n defined by stopping set Ci and (n+1)∗σ at
moments n+ 1, n+ 2, . . ., then the expected payoff of the player i, when history
of the process up to moment n− 1 is known, is given by
ϕn(Xn−1,C i) = EXn−1
[
fi(Xn)Ii∗Dn(Din) + vi(Xn)Ii∗Dn(Din)
]
,
where i∗Dn(A) = Π(∗D1n, . . . ,
∗Di−1n , A,
∗Di+1n , . . . ,
∗Dpn),
∗Djn = {ω ∈ Ω : ∗σjn = 1},
j = 1, 2, . . . , p, j 6= i, and Din = {ω ∈ Ω : σin = 1} = 1} = {ω ∈ Ω : Xn ∈ Ci}. By
Lemma 5.6 the conditional expected gain ϕn(Xn−1,C i) attains the maximum on
the stopping set ∗C in = {x ∈ E : fi(x) ≥ vi(x)} and
ϕn(Xn−1, ∗C i) = Ex[(fi(Xn)− vi(Xn))+Ii∗Dn(Ω)|Fn−1]
−Ex[(fi(Xn)− vi(Xn))−Ii∗Dn(∅)|Fn−1]
+Ex[vi(Xn)|Fn−1].
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Let us assume that there exists solution (w1(x), w2(x), . . . , wp(x)) of the equa-
tions
wi(x) = Ex(fi(X1)− wi(X1))+Ii∗D1(Ω)(6.1)
−Ex(fi(X1)− wi(X1))−Ii∗D1(∅) + Exwi(X1),
i = 1, 2, . . . , p. Consider the stopping game with the following payoff function
for i = 1, 2, . . . , p.
φi,N(x) =
{
fi(x) if n < N,
vi(x) if n ≥ N.
Lemma 6.2. Let ∗σ ∈ S∗f be an equilibrium strategy in the infinite horizon game
G. For every N we have
Exφi,N(Xt∗) = vi(x).
Let us assume that for i = 1, 2, . . . , p and every x ∈ E we have
(6.3) Ex[supn∈N f
+
i (Xn)] <∞.
Theorem 6.4. Let (Xn,Fn,Px)
∞
n=0 be a homogeneous Markov chain and the pay-
off functions of the players fulfill (6.3). If t∗ = t(∗σ), ∗σ ∈ S∗f then Exfi(Xt∗) =
vi(x).
Theorem 6.5. Let the stopping strategy ∗σ ∈ S∗f be defined by the stopping sets
∗C in = {x ∈ E : fi(x) ≥ vi(x)}, i = 1, 2, . . . , p, then ∗σ is the equilibrium strategy
in the infinite stopping game G.
6.1. Determining the strategies of sensors. Based on the model constructed
in Sections 3–5 for the net of sensors with the fusion center determined by a sim-
ple game, one can determine the rational decisions of each nodes. The rationality
of such a construction refers to the individual aspiration for the highest sensitivity
to detect the disorder without false alarm. The Nash equilibrium fulfills require-
ment that nobody deviates from the equilibrium strategy because its probability
of detection will be smaller. The role of the simple game is to define wining
coalitions in such a way that the detection of intrusion to the guarded area is
maximal and the probability of false alarm is minimal. The method of construct-
ing the optimum winning coalitions family is not the subject of the research in
this article. However, there are some natural methods of solving this problem.
The research here is focused on constructing the solution of the non-cooperative
stopping game as to determine the detection strategy of the sensors. To this end,
the game analyzed in Section 5 with the payoff function of the players defined
by the individual disorder problem formulated in Section 3 should be derived.
The proposed model disregards correlation of the signals. It is also assumed
that the fusion center has perfect information about signals and the information
On the Masami Yasuda stopping game 13
is available at each node. The further research should help to qualify these real
needs of such models and to extend the model to more general cases. In some
type of distribution of sensors, e.g. when the distribution of the pollution in the
given direction is observed, the multiple disorder model should work better than
the game approach. In this case the a priori distribution of disorder moment
has the form of sequentially dependent random moments and the fusion decision
can be formulated as the threshold one: stop when k∗ disorder is detected. The
method of a cooperative game was used in [8] to find the best coalition of sensors
in the problem of the target localization. The approach which is proposed here
shows possibility of modelling the detection problem by multiple agents at a
general level.
6.2. Final conclusion concerning the disorder detection system. In a
general case the consideration of the paper [39] leads to the algorithm of con-
structing the disorder detection system.
Figure 1. Sudety Mountains. International Conference on Math-
ematical Statistics STAT’2000. Szklarska Pore¸ba, Poland, August,
2000
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Figure 2. RIMS Conference 2002, Kyoto, Japan. From the left:
the author of this note, professors Masami Yasuda, Vladimir V.
Mazalov and Mitsushi Tamaki
6.2.1. Algorithm.
(1) Define a simple game on the sensors.
(2) Describe signal processes and a priori distribution of the disorder mo-
ments at all sensors. Establish the a posteriori processes:
−→
Π n = (Π1n, . . . ,Πmn),
where Πkn = P(θ ≤ n|Fn).
(3) Solve the multivariate stopping game on the simple game to get the in-
dividual strategies of the sensors.
7. The contribution to the mathematical education, the
scientific cooperation and the friendship
It was 1994 when I came to Japan for the first time based on Prof. Minoru Sak-
aguchi and Prof. Katsunori Ano invitation to take part in the International Con-
ference on Stochastic Models and Optimal Stopping, Nanzan University, Nagoya.
Since this event Professor Masami Yasuda is my guide in the mathematics and
the Japanese culture. When the Internet connected the people we discussed
the game model, which I call myself the Masami Yasuda game described in this
note in the sections 1.2 and 2. Based on the discussion we have written the
papers [40] and [47]. Our meeting and discussion were in Poland (see Figure 1),
Japan (see Figure 2) and Russia (see Figure 3). Last year, during the one day
workshop, the possible further research and academic cooperation was the topic
of our discussion. Based on European Union integration processes the Polish
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Figure 3. 13th Symposium of ISDG 2008, St.Petersburg, Russia
educational system is under very intensive reconstruction process. The mathe-
matical education of engineering faculties students is very fragile task. Professor
Yasuda provides us his extensive academic experience by his contribution to our
local conferences devoted to teaching mathematics for non-mathematical major
students. Such organized events were in Ibaraki National College of Technology,
Hitachinaka (2006) and Wroc law Univeristy of Technology (2008).
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